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To what category of optical illusions does this image belong?

To what category of optical illusions does this image belong?



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To what class of optical illusions does the below image belong? The diagonal lines are parallel, but because of the context, the longer of the two appears bent.


To what category of optical illusions does this image belong?

This appears to be a modified Hering illusion or rather it seems to rely on the same principle:

Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License: Wikipedia 2018.

There are several possible explanations for why perceptual distortion produced by the radiating pattern. The illusion was ascribed by Hering to an overestimation of the angle made at the points of intersection. If true, then the straightness of the parallel lines yields to that of the radiating lines, implying that there is a hierarchical ordering among components of such illusion. Others have suggested that angle overestimation results from lateral inhibition in visual cortex, while others have postulated a bias inherent in extrapolating 3D angle information from 2D projections.

The modification in the case of your example with the radiant part being at the corner where the vertical rises from the tip of the left hand parallel line.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hering_illusion

That being said, see Ames room illusion for comparison of a superficially similar setup.


To what category of optical illusions does this image belong? - Psychology

Media Licence:

Illusion Credit

Instructions

Look at the cube and think about where the front face of the cube is. Is it above or below the back face? Hover your cursor over the image and then remove it to highlight different faces of the cube that you might experience as being the front face.

Effect

One can experience the cube in two distinct ways: (1) with the front face of the cube below and to the left of the back face of the cube, (2) with the front face of the cube above and to the right the back face of the cube. One's experience seems to "flip" from being as of a cube pointing down and left to a cube pointing up and to the right. In addition, it is possible to experience the image just as a series of 2-D lines on the screen.

Media Licence:

Illusion Credit

The Necker Cube Ambiguous Figure is named after its creator, Louis Albert Necker (1786-1861), who first published the illusion in the London and Edinburgh Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science in 1832.

The Necker Cube Ambiguous Figure belongs in a large class of illusions where a two-dimensional figure, or three-dimensional object can be seen in two or more sharply distinct ways. There are many example of ambiguous figures which you can search for in this illusions index.

One reason that the Necker Cube is so interesting is that although it is perhaps most natural to see the image as one of two cubes differently oriented in space, it is possible to see it as simply a 2-D figure on the page. Therefore the Necker Cube is three-way ambiguous. The fact that one can see the image as both 2-D and 3-D feeds into the debate about whether visual experience represents 2-D or 3-D space. If the 2-D/3-D Gestalt switch is a change in the visual experience itself as seems to be the case (rather than a change in our beliefs about the image) then this would best be explained by visual experience being as of 3-D space.

Relatedly, there is another version of the Necker Cube which looks like a 2-D figure at first, but can be seen as a 3-D cube also, as illustrated below.

There is some controversy over how the Necker Cube Ambiguous Figure works. It is generally agreed that the retinal image is constant when experiencing the illusion, but what is not agreed is whether the visual experience of the cube changes when the perspectival switch takes place, or whether the experience itself does not change, and it is some post-experiential belief, judgment, or other mental process which changes. The Necker Cube, among other ambiguous figures, has been cited in debates over this issue (Silins 2015: §2.4).

This issue is intertwined with more general questions about the modularity of mind and cognitive penetration. To explain: on the hypothesis that the mind is modular, a mental module is a kind of semi-independent department of the mind which deals with particular types of inputs, and gives particular types of outputs, and whose inner workings are not accessible to the conscious awareness of the person – all one can get access to are the relevant outputs. So, in the case of visual illusions, for example, a standard way of explaining why the illusion persists even though one knows that one is experiencing an illusion is that the module, or modules, which constitute the visual system are ‘cognitively impenetrable’ to some degree – i.e. their inner workings and outputs cannot be influenced by conscious awareness. It is still an open question regarding the extent to which perceptual modules are cognitively impenetrable, and ambiguous figures are employed in debates to try and answer that question. One way in which ambiguous figures might support the claim that visual processing is impenetrable to a significant degree is that the Gestalt switch is hard to control – often one will see a figure one way or another even if one is trying to see it the other way. Macpherson discusses this phenomenon and its implications in her 2012 paper. Further, there is some evidence from neuroscience that, for at least some ambiguous figures, there are significant changes in early-stage visual processing in the brain when the Gestalt switch is taking place, which might support the hypothesis that Gestalt switches in general are changes in the experience itself rather than in downstream mental processes like beliefs about that experience (see Kornmeier & Bach 2006, 2012).

Finally, ambiguous figures have been cited in debates about whether the nature of experience can be fully accounted for by appealing only to its representational content. Some philosophers and cognitive scientists distinguish between the phenomenal character of an experience – i.e. what it is like for a conscious subject to undergo that experience – and its representational content – i.e. what the experience is about. Some philosophers, known as ‘representationalists’ argue that the phenomenal character of experience can be accounted for fully in terms of the representational content of experience. One motivation for this argument is that representational content seems easier to ‘naturalise’ – i.e. for its nature to be explained in purely materialist terms by appealing solely to physical entities like brain states. Phenomenal character, on the other hand, seems much more resistant to attempts to naturalise it. But if phenomenal character can be fully accounted for in representationalist terms, then this would make the naturalising of phenomenal character seem much more tractable. And, ambiguous figures are among the key examples discussed in debates about whether phenomenal character can be fully accounted for in representationalist terms. For example, Macpherson (2006) has argued that the changes in phenomenal character that occur when experiencing some ambiguous figures cannot be explained in naturalistic, representationalist terms. Macpherson’s 2006 paper provides an overview of the general debate and its many moving parts.

References

Kornmeier, J. and Bach, M., 2005. The Necker cube—an ambiguous figure disambiguated in early visual processing. Vision research, 45(8), pp.955-960.

Kornmeier, J. and Bach, M., 2012. Ambiguous figures–what happens in the brain when perception changes but not the stimulus. Frontiers in human neuroscience, 6.

Necker, L.A., 1832. Observations on some remarkable optical phaenomena seen in Switzerland and on an optical phaenomenon which occurs on viewing a figure of a crystal or geometrical solid. London and Edinburgh Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science, third series, Vol. 1, No. 5, pp. 329-337.

Silins, N., 2015. Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Justification. In: Zalta, E. N., ed. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, CSLI, Stanford University.

Macpherson, F., 2006. Ambiguous figures and the content of experience. Noûs 40 (1):82-117.

Macpherson, F., 2012. Cognitive penetration of colour experience: Rethinking the issue in light of an indirect mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(1), pp.24-62.


What is Role Theory? (with pictures)

Role theory is a way of thinking about the world that focuses on the roles people play in society. In the language of this perspective, a role roughly relates to a job or a social category, such as mother, boss, or teacher. In a more nuanced understanding of this theory, the use of the term role is actually much broader and may include roles that exist only between two people in relation to one another or roles that are adopted only temporarily. The primary goal of role theory is looking at how the roles people play affect their interactions, which can help elucidate why people act the way they do.

One of the most important concepts in role theory is that people act out certain roles in ways that can be relatively well predicted. Each role has certain obligations to act in a specific way, and a person will typically fulfill these obligations subconsciously. A role is not something that is natural to a person, but is rather a group of behaviors that the person somehow comes to fulfill.

Roles, in role theory, are not like roles in a play, but are rather like states of being. A person might act as a teacher in one instance, for example, and as a wife in another. Both roles belong to the person in question, but the relevant role has more influence over the situation than irrelevant roles. When a person chooses the wrong role for a situation, such as acting as a teacher to a spouse, disastrous consequences may occur.

According to role theory, roles are not necessarily chosen by the people who fill them. For example, a person may wish to be a superior, but may be put in a subordinate role because all the people around the person believe that to be the person's appropriate role. It is also possible for conflict to arise when a person disagrees with the constraints of a role to which he or she has been consigned. People are constantly redefining what behaviors belong to which roles, although changes are not always obvious except on the historical scale.

In someone's personal life, awareness of the different roles a person plays can be helpful when determining why someone is dissatisfied. If a person disagrees with a certain role but feels pressured by society to continue fulfilling that role, extreme dissatisfaction may result. Also, looking at how different roles interact in a person's own life can help illuminate why certain relationships fail to function. Overall, a basic knowledge of role theory can help an individual puzzle through many difficulties in his or her life.


To what category of optical illusions does this image belong? - Psychology

Media Licence:

Illusion Credit

Instructions

If you see a vase: look at the edges of the vase either side and think of the innermost indent as the tip of the nose outline, the indent above that as the eye outline, the double indent below as the mouth outline. If you see two faces: think of the edges of each face forming the outline of a symmetrical vase.

Effect

You should experience a 'Gestalt switch' between seeing the image as a vase and two opposing faces.

Media Licence:
Media Source:

Illusion Credit

Media Licence:
Media Source:

The Rubin’s Vase Ambiguous Figure (also known as Rubin’s Face, Figure-Ground Vase) was discovered by Edgar John Rubin (1886 - 1951), Danish psychologist and philosopher. The figure was first published in Rubin’s doctoral thesis, Synsoplevede figurer, in 1915.

The Rubin’s Vase Ambiguous Figure belongs in a large class of ambiguous illusions in which a stimulus be seen or heard or otherwise perceived in two or more sharply distinct ways. There are many example of ambiguous figures which you can search for in this illusions index.

There is some controversy over how the Rubin’s Vase Ambiguous Figure works. It is generally agreed that the retinal image is constant when experiencing the illusion, but what is not agreed is whether the visual experience of the figure changes when the perspectival switch takes place between seeing the vase versus the two opposed faces in profile, or whether the experience itself does not change, and it is some post-experiential belief, judgment, or other mental process which changes. Rubin’s Vase, among other ambiguous figures, has been cited in debates over this issue (Silins 2015: §2.4).

This issue is intertwined with more general questions about the modularity of mind and cognitive penetration. To explain: on the hypothesis that the mind is modular, a mental module is a kind of semi-independent department of the mind which deals with particular types of inputs, and gives particular types of outputs, and whose inner workings are not accessible to the conscious awareness of the person – all one can get access to are the relevant outputs. So, in the case of visual illusions, for example, a standard way of explaining why the illusion persists even though one knows that one is experiencing an illusion is that the module, or modules, which constitute the visual system are ‘cognitively impenetrable’ to some degree – i.e. their inner workings and outputs cannot be influenced by conscious awareness. It is still an open question regarding the extent to which perceptual modules are cognitively impenetrable, and Rubin’s Vase belongs in a large class of illusions which are employed in debates to try and answer that question. One way in which ambiguous figures like Rubin’s Vase might support the claim that visual processing is impenetrable to a significant degree is that the Gestalt switch is hard to control – often one will see Rubin’s Vase one way or another even if one is trying to see it the other way. Macpherson discusses this phenomenon and its implications in her 2012 paper. Further, there is some evidence from neuroscience that, for at least some ambiguous figures, there are significant changes in early-stage visual processing in the brain when the Gestalt switch is taking place, which might support the hypothesis that Gestalt switches in general are changes in the experience itself rather than in downstream mental processes like beliefs about that experience (see Kornmeier & Bach 2006, 2012).

Finally, ambiguous figures have been cited in debates about whether the nature of experience can be fully accounted for by appealing only to its representational content. Some philosophers and cognitive scientists distinguish between the phenomenal character of an experience – i.e. what it is like for a conscious subject to undergo that experience – and its representational content – i.e. what the experience is about. Some philosophers, known as ‘representationalists’ argue that the phenomenal character of experience can be accounted for fully in terms of the representational content of experience. One motivation for this argument is that representational content seems easier to ‘naturalise’ – i.e. for its nature to be explained in purely materialist terms by appealing solely to physical entities like brain states. Phenomenal character, on the other hand, seems much more resistant to attempts to naturalise it. But if phenomenal character can be fully accounted for in representationalist terms, then this would make the naturalising of phenomenal character seem much more tractable. And, ambiguous figures are among the key examples discussed in debates about whether phenomenal character can be fully accounted for in representationalist terms. For example, Macpherson (2006) has argued that the changes in phenomenal character that occur when experiencing some ambiguous figures cannot be explained in naturalistic, representationalist terms. Macpherson’s 2006 paper provides an overview of the general debate and its many moving parts.

References

Rubin, E., 1915. Synsoplevede figurer. Studier i psykologisk Analyse. Første Del. Copenhagen and Christiania: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag.

Kornmeier, J. and Bach, M., 2005. The Necker cube—an ambiguous figure disambiguated in early visual processing. Vision Research, 45(8), pp.955-960.

Kornmeier, J. and Bach, M., 2012. Ambiguous figures–what happens in the brain when perception changes but not the stimulus. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6.

Necker, L.A., 1832. Observations on some remarkable optical phaenomena seen in Switzerland and on an optical phaenomenon which occurs on viewing a figure of a crystal or geometrical solid. London and Edinburgh Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science.

Silins, N., 2015. Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Justification. In: Zalta, E. N., ed. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, CSLI, Stanford University.

Macpherson, F., 2006. Ambiguous figures and the content of experience. Noûs 40 (1):82-117.

Macpherson, F., 2012. Cognitive penetration of colour experience: Rethinking the issue in light of an indirect mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(1), pp.24-62.


Full-text

1 Modern philosophy, and Descartes in particular, are often accused of having accentuated the danger of skepticism (the “loss of the world”) in seeking to prove the existence of the material world and, to this end, of having assisted in ushering in ideas as a sort of intermediary entity forming a screen, or a veil, in between the mind and things. In his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Reid writes:

3 This critique of modern philosophers is not new and remains current in our times. [2] For the question to what extent one can be a direct realist is still a live debate within philosophy today. In this gigantomachy, the name “Descartes” is used to reduce to ashes a sort of naive representationalism that we find translated in the contemporary vocabulary of cognitivist philosophy. [3]

4 But is Descartes really a partisan of this so fiercely decried representationalism? We certainly find literally in his philosophy the incriminating thesis: that we only know things through the intermediary of our ideas.

6 Although the subject can know things only “by means of” his ideas, Descartes does not consider the idea as a mere mental, private, object, since “to have an idea” is nothing other than to have “a perception that responds to the meaning of a word”. [5] He is far from identifying the idea with a copy, a similitude, of things outside us, in which things would be seen “as in a mirror”—ideas are tanquam rerum imagines, “like images of things” his critique of scholastic species shows that he does not agree that resemblance explains the representative function of ideas. [6]

7 In Descartes”s vocabulary, “perception” designates, in general, the possession of an idea, the mental act or state of representing such and such a thing, and not necessarily what we now call “perception”—or more precisely, “sensible perception”. As we know, Descartes proposes a particular explanation for the latter in Dioptrics IV. After all, his description of the nature of ideas returns to the framework of the general theory of a perception “mediated” by ideas.

8 In the examination of the nature and the status of the Cartesian philosophy of ideas, Austin is useful because, although he takes up the critique of the theory of “indirect” perception, he begins by emphasising that the question of knowing whether we should be direct realists is badly posed:

10 In Sense and Sensibilia, Austin gives an analysis of the famous illusion of the stick “bent” by its immersion in water, [8] which goes back prior to Descartes, to a fourteenth-century author, Pierre d”Auriole. [9] Austin demonstrates the ambiguity of expressions such as “looks like” or “seems to be”, as in when we say “the stick seems to be bent”. The argument from illusion would maintain that experience is representational and that, in perception, we have “a visual appearance” that is the immediate object of vision. In other words, it would judge that the stick is bent in so far as it is effectively represented as bent. Austin argues, on the contrary, that this is not a case of an illusion of the senses, but maintains that what we have an experience of, is a stick partly immersed in water, and which seems bent to us. Things look like what they are, no more and no less. [10]

11 The “argument from illusion”—the idea that our senses can be fooled—is thus a pretext for positing the existence of intermediary entities, or what he designates, in the context of analytic philosophy, with the term “sense-perceptions”:

13 Austin emphasises that we are not deceived by our senses, but neither do they inform us sensory perceptions are not incorrigible: the way in which things appear to us is perpetually corrigible. Rereading the Cartesian texts on the basis of Austin”s analyses will allow me to show that treating perception as a mental act does not necessarily imply that representations must be considered as objects that are perceived. It is because we can change our way of seeing things, that we can say that we only know things through the intermediary of our ideas. If things look like what they are, as Austin thinks, it would be regrettable to judge them, as we often do, as mere appearances. Certainly, to see is above all to see the things of the world but to say that our perceptions are that by which we think, or perceive, is simply to draw our attention to the fact that, in reflecting upon our thoughts, we can change our way of seeing, and that, in so far as philosophy is an activity which consists in making our thoughts clear, it constitutes a desirable change. [12]


Monday

Word Optical Illusions in Advertising

This ad campaign for Veja Magazine not only combined words to make images but also won a Gold and two Silvers in the 2004 Clio awards.

Category-Print: Media Promotion
Ad Agency: AlmapBBDO, Sao Paulo
Account Executive: Fico Meirelles, Izabella Villaca
Creative Director: Marcello Serpa
Copywriter: Sophie Schoenburg
Art Director: Roberto Fernandez
Production Manager: Jose Roberto Bezerra
Illustrator: Roberto Fernandez

2 comments:

Can I use some of these photos for our report in Psychology 148 (Cognitive Psychology) on Illusions on Advertising? These photos sure are helpful in illustrating the figure-ground principle in Gestalt Psychology.

I am a 3rd year student from the University of the Philippines.

I don't have the right to grant you permission to use these works because I don't own the copyright. Check with your University and see if non-profit educational use is granted by default in your country. You can also contact the magazine or the ad agency.

Good Luck with your report.

The documents distributed here have been presented on this blog in the spirit of providing an entertaining venue to educate those interested in optical illusions.

All Flckr.com photos are presented here via Flckr's "blog this" feature. This feature is enabled by each artist on Flckr. If you find material here that belongs to you and you would like to have it removed or credited please contact me and I will gladly follow your wishes.

Copyright and all rights therein are maintained by the authors or by other copyright holders. It is understood that all persons copying this information will adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each author's copyright. These works may not be reposted without the explicit permission of the copyright holder.


Only True Empaths Can Pass This Imagery Personality Test: QUIZ

You have been hearing it probably that you are an empath but you are confused. This fun Imagery Empath test will reveal your true personality.

“Empathy is the only human superpower – it can shrink distance, cut through social and power hierarchies, transcend differences, and provoke political and social change.” ― Elizabeth Thomas

Empathy is very important because we can understand and feel how others are feeling and respond accordingly to the situation. Research shows that greater the empathy more will be the helping behaviour.

Empathy is related to kindness but being an empath is much more than being kind. It’s about feeling the energies, about absorbing the energies of others around you. You might be a kind and sensitive person but you might not be an empath. While some empaths can identify themselves, some find it difficult to do so.

Being an empath is advantageous because we can sense others intentions and help or deceive them.

So, if your peers are telling you that you are an empath and you want to be sure of it or if you are having a feeling within yourself that you are an empath, you should take this quiz.

This quiz tests you with some imageries and calculates the results revealing your true identity, whether you are a highly sensitive person or an actual empath.


Perceiver-distortion illusions

Some illusions are related to characteristics of the perceiver, namely the functioning of the brain and the senses, rather than to physical phenomena that distort a stimulus. Many common visual illusions are perceptual: they result from the brain’s processing of ambiguous or unusual visual information. Other illusions result from the aftereffects of sensory stimulation or from conflicting sensory information. Still others are associated with psychiatric causes.


To what category of optical illusions does this image belong? - Psychology

It must be one of the most familiar images in modern art: a space-distorting interior that could never exist in reality, dominated by staircases sprouting surreally in all directions, and filled with expressionless, mannequin-like figures walking up and down like members of a religious order calmly going about their daily business.

Since the original lithograph was produced in the summer of 1953, Relativity – which belongs to a series of five prints by the same artist also featuring impossible constructions and multiple vanishing points – has been reproduced countless times on posters, mugs, T-shirts, items of stationery and even duvet covers.

Yet, if we’re honest, how much do most of us really know about its creator, the Dutch printmaker MC Escher (1898-1972)? The truth is that outside his homeland Escher remains something of an enigma. Moreover, despite the popularity of his fastidious optical illusions, Escher continues to suffer from snobbery within the realm of fine art, where his output is often denigrated as little more than technically accomplished graphic design.

In Britain, for instance, it appears that only a single work by Escher belongs to a public collection: the woodcut Day and Night, which presents two flocks of birds, one black and one white, flying above a flat Dutch landscape in between a pair of rivers. Day and Night was Escher’s most popular print: during the course of his lifetime, he made more than 650 copies of it, painstakingly rendering each impression with the help of a small egg spoon made of bone.

Day and Night was Escher’s most popular print: during the course of his lifetime (Credit: 2015 The M.C. Escher Company – Baarn, The Netherlands)

Yet, as Patrick Elliott of the Scottish National Gallery of Modern Art points out, even the print of Day and Night in the collection of the University of Glasgow’s Hunterian Museum and Art Gallery “was actually acquired by the Geography Department and was transferred to the Museum at a later date”.

So who was Escher – and does he deserve the indifferent reputation as a fine artist that fate has dealt him? These are some of the questions posed by The Amazing World of MC Escher, a forthcoming exhibition at the Scottish National Gallery of Modern Art in Edinburgh, which also happens to be the artist’s first major UK retrospective.

‘Miserable memories’

Born in the small city of Leeuwarden in the north of the Netherlands, Maurits Cornelis Escher, who was always known in his family as “Mauk”, grew up in a prosperous household as the fifth son of a civil engineer who was a senior official at the Department of Public Works.

At secondary school in the city of Arnhem, where his family had moved in 1903, he had an unhappy time – and his miserable memories of this period of his life had a decisive influence upon many of his later prints, including Relativity.

Indeed, decades after “the hell that was Arnhem”, as Escher later described his schooldays, he made a number of works featuring versions of the institution’s dramatic staircase, which he had ascended so frequently as a boy. The resemblance between the school’s staircase in reality and the structures in Escher’s prints is remarkable.

In 1919, Escher enrolled at the School of Architecture and Decorative Arts in Haarlem. His father hoped that he would become an architect, but, influenced by his graphic arts teacher, who had spotted his talent as a printmaker, Escher was determined to become an artist. As an adult, he pursued this career – combining travel, when he sketched and came up with ideas for future works (his two visits to the Moorish palace of the Alhambra in Granada were especially important, since they taught him how to work with tessellating patterns), with long stints at home, where he led a remarkably orderly life.

“He had a severe daily routine mixing working and walking and meeting visitors,” says Micky Piller, curator of Escher in Het Paleis, the museum devoted to the artist’s works in The Hague, where selections are shown from the collection of the Gemeentemuseum, which has also loaned works to the exhibition in Edinburgh. “He liked to observe nature, the sky, and birds. He loved classical music, especially Bach.”

A ‘one-man art movement’

Despite his self-discipline, however, Escher only became able to support himself solely from art during his late fifties. By then he had discovered his principal theme of perspective-mangling worlds, familiar from works such as Belvedere (1958), Ascending and Descending (1960), and Waterfall (1961), as well as Relativity. He was also known for executing his prints to a very high level.


Belonging to Many Social Groups Matters More in Some Cultures

Decades of psychology research have shown something that pretty much makes sense: people who belong to more social groups tend to be happier. People who belong to multiple social groups have more access to social support, so it didn’t really come as a surprise when study after study confirmed that these people score higher on measures of psychological wellbeing.

But wait! There’s a problem.

Like a lot of psychological research, most of these studies were done on WEIRD people – that is, Western, educated people from industrialized, rich, democratic countries.

This limitation of previous research led a group of psychologists from University of Queensland to suggest that the link between multiple social group membership and happiness might be culture-specific.

What clued them onto this idea was that access to social support is one of the main benefits of multiple group membership, but different cultures have different norms around seeking social support. Asians and Asian Americans, for example, seem to be less likely to seek out social support, possibly because they’re more attentive to possible downsides of doing so like burdening others.

Based on this, the researchers from University of Queensland conjectured that Westerners would benefit more than Asians from belonging to multiple social groups.

To test their hypothesis, they performed a series of studies looking at participants’ social group membership and psychological wellbeing. As expected, the studies showed that Westerners who belonged to more social groups – including through friends, family, recreational activities, etc. – reported being happier and less depressed.

When the researchers looked at Asian participants, however, they didn’t find the same effect. In fact, belonging to more social groups generally just wasn’t associated with being happier for these participants. The one exception was for Asians who were the least reluctant to seek out social support from others – among this small subgroup, multiple group membership was related to happiness.

These findings indicate that belonging to many social groups may be more important in some cultures than others because cultural norms can determine what people get out of multiple group membership.

More generally, this research is also a reminder that things we think we know about how people work can turn out only to be true of how people work in certain environments.

All told, you’re still doing yourself a favor by actively participating in more social groups rather than fewer. But just belonging to many social groups may not be enough – whether multiple group membership affects your happiness seems to depend on whether you’re proactive about seeking out the advantages associated with the groups you belong to.

What d’you think? Are you surprised that the link between multiple social group membership and happiness is culture-specific? Please share in the comments!


What is Role Theory? (with pictures)

Role theory is a way of thinking about the world that focuses on the roles people play in society. In the language of this perspective, a role roughly relates to a job or a social category, such as mother, boss, or teacher. In a more nuanced understanding of this theory, the use of the term role is actually much broader and may include roles that exist only between two people in relation to one another or roles that are adopted only temporarily. The primary goal of role theory is looking at how the roles people play affect their interactions, which can help elucidate why people act the way they do.

One of the most important concepts in role theory is that people act out certain roles in ways that can be relatively well predicted. Each role has certain obligations to act in a specific way, and a person will typically fulfill these obligations subconsciously. A role is not something that is natural to a person, but is rather a group of behaviors that the person somehow comes to fulfill.

Roles, in role theory, are not like roles in a play, but are rather like states of being. A person might act as a teacher in one instance, for example, and as a wife in another. Both roles belong to the person in question, but the relevant role has more influence over the situation than irrelevant roles. When a person chooses the wrong role for a situation, such as acting as a teacher to a spouse, disastrous consequences may occur.

According to role theory, roles are not necessarily chosen by the people who fill them. For example, a person may wish to be a superior, but may be put in a subordinate role because all the people around the person believe that to be the person's appropriate role. It is also possible for conflict to arise when a person disagrees with the constraints of a role to which he or she has been consigned. People are constantly redefining what behaviors belong to which roles, although changes are not always obvious except on the historical scale.

In someone's personal life, awareness of the different roles a person plays can be helpful when determining why someone is dissatisfied. If a person disagrees with a certain role but feels pressured by society to continue fulfilling that role, extreme dissatisfaction may result. Also, looking at how different roles interact in a person's own life can help illuminate why certain relationships fail to function. Overall, a basic knowledge of role theory can help an individual puzzle through many difficulties in his or her life.


Perceiver-distortion illusions

Some illusions are related to characteristics of the perceiver, namely the functioning of the brain and the senses, rather than to physical phenomena that distort a stimulus. Many common visual illusions are perceptual: they result from the brain’s processing of ambiguous or unusual visual information. Other illusions result from the aftereffects of sensory stimulation or from conflicting sensory information. Still others are associated with psychiatric causes.


Monday

Word Optical Illusions in Advertising

This ad campaign for Veja Magazine not only combined words to make images but also won a Gold and two Silvers in the 2004 Clio awards.

Category-Print: Media Promotion
Ad Agency: AlmapBBDO, Sao Paulo
Account Executive: Fico Meirelles, Izabella Villaca
Creative Director: Marcello Serpa
Copywriter: Sophie Schoenburg
Art Director: Roberto Fernandez
Production Manager: Jose Roberto Bezerra
Illustrator: Roberto Fernandez

2 comments:

Can I use some of these photos for our report in Psychology 148 (Cognitive Psychology) on Illusions on Advertising? These photos sure are helpful in illustrating the figure-ground principle in Gestalt Psychology.

I am a 3rd year student from the University of the Philippines.

I don't have the right to grant you permission to use these works because I don't own the copyright. Check with your University and see if non-profit educational use is granted by default in your country. You can also contact the magazine or the ad agency.

Good Luck with your report.

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To what category of optical illusions does this image belong? - Psychology

Media Licence:

Illusion Credit

Instructions

If you see a vase: look at the edges of the vase either side and think of the innermost indent as the tip of the nose outline, the indent above that as the eye outline, the double indent below as the mouth outline. If you see two faces: think of the edges of each face forming the outline of a symmetrical vase.

Effect

You should experience a 'Gestalt switch' between seeing the image as a vase and two opposing faces.

Media Licence:
Media Source:

Illusion Credit

Media Licence:
Media Source:

The Rubin’s Vase Ambiguous Figure (also known as Rubin’s Face, Figure-Ground Vase) was discovered by Edgar John Rubin (1886 - 1951), Danish psychologist and philosopher. The figure was first published in Rubin’s doctoral thesis, Synsoplevede figurer, in 1915.

The Rubin’s Vase Ambiguous Figure belongs in a large class of ambiguous illusions in which a stimulus be seen or heard or otherwise perceived in two or more sharply distinct ways. There are many example of ambiguous figures which you can search for in this illusions index.

There is some controversy over how the Rubin’s Vase Ambiguous Figure works. It is generally agreed that the retinal image is constant when experiencing the illusion, but what is not agreed is whether the visual experience of the figure changes when the perspectival switch takes place between seeing the vase versus the two opposed faces in profile, or whether the experience itself does not change, and it is some post-experiential belief, judgment, or other mental process which changes. Rubin’s Vase, among other ambiguous figures, has been cited in debates over this issue (Silins 2015: §2.4).

This issue is intertwined with more general questions about the modularity of mind and cognitive penetration. To explain: on the hypothesis that the mind is modular, a mental module is a kind of semi-independent department of the mind which deals with particular types of inputs, and gives particular types of outputs, and whose inner workings are not accessible to the conscious awareness of the person – all one can get access to are the relevant outputs. So, in the case of visual illusions, for example, a standard way of explaining why the illusion persists even though one knows that one is experiencing an illusion is that the module, or modules, which constitute the visual system are ‘cognitively impenetrable’ to some degree – i.e. their inner workings and outputs cannot be influenced by conscious awareness. It is still an open question regarding the extent to which perceptual modules are cognitively impenetrable, and Rubin’s Vase belongs in a large class of illusions which are employed in debates to try and answer that question. One way in which ambiguous figures like Rubin’s Vase might support the claim that visual processing is impenetrable to a significant degree is that the Gestalt switch is hard to control – often one will see Rubin’s Vase one way or another even if one is trying to see it the other way. Macpherson discusses this phenomenon and its implications in her 2012 paper. Further, there is some evidence from neuroscience that, for at least some ambiguous figures, there are significant changes in early-stage visual processing in the brain when the Gestalt switch is taking place, which might support the hypothesis that Gestalt switches in general are changes in the experience itself rather than in downstream mental processes like beliefs about that experience (see Kornmeier & Bach 2006, 2012).

Finally, ambiguous figures have been cited in debates about whether the nature of experience can be fully accounted for by appealing only to its representational content. Some philosophers and cognitive scientists distinguish between the phenomenal character of an experience – i.e. what it is like for a conscious subject to undergo that experience – and its representational content – i.e. what the experience is about. Some philosophers, known as ‘representationalists’ argue that the phenomenal character of experience can be accounted for fully in terms of the representational content of experience. One motivation for this argument is that representational content seems easier to ‘naturalise’ – i.e. for its nature to be explained in purely materialist terms by appealing solely to physical entities like brain states. Phenomenal character, on the other hand, seems much more resistant to attempts to naturalise it. But if phenomenal character can be fully accounted for in representationalist terms, then this would make the naturalising of phenomenal character seem much more tractable. And, ambiguous figures are among the key examples discussed in debates about whether phenomenal character can be fully accounted for in representationalist terms. For example, Macpherson (2006) has argued that the changes in phenomenal character that occur when experiencing some ambiguous figures cannot be explained in naturalistic, representationalist terms. Macpherson’s 2006 paper provides an overview of the general debate and its many moving parts.

References

Rubin, E., 1915. Synsoplevede figurer. Studier i psykologisk Analyse. Første Del. Copenhagen and Christiania: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag.

Kornmeier, J. and Bach, M., 2005. The Necker cube—an ambiguous figure disambiguated in early visual processing. Vision Research, 45(8), pp.955-960.

Kornmeier, J. and Bach, M., 2012. Ambiguous figures–what happens in the brain when perception changes but not the stimulus. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6.

Necker, L.A., 1832. Observations on some remarkable optical phaenomena seen in Switzerland and on an optical phaenomenon which occurs on viewing a figure of a crystal or geometrical solid. London and Edinburgh Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science.

Silins, N., 2015. Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Justification. In: Zalta, E. N., ed. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, CSLI, Stanford University.

Macpherson, F., 2006. Ambiguous figures and the content of experience. Noûs 40 (1):82-117.

Macpherson, F., 2012. Cognitive penetration of colour experience: Rethinking the issue in light of an indirect mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(1), pp.24-62.


Full-text

1 Modern philosophy, and Descartes in particular, are often accused of having accentuated the danger of skepticism (the “loss of the world”) in seeking to prove the existence of the material world and, to this end, of having assisted in ushering in ideas as a sort of intermediary entity forming a screen, or a veil, in between the mind and things. In his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Reid writes:

3 This critique of modern philosophers is not new and remains current in our times. [2] For the question to what extent one can be a direct realist is still a live debate within philosophy today. In this gigantomachy, the name “Descartes” is used to reduce to ashes a sort of naive representationalism that we find translated in the contemporary vocabulary of cognitivist philosophy. [3]

4 But is Descartes really a partisan of this so fiercely decried representationalism? We certainly find literally in his philosophy the incriminating thesis: that we only know things through the intermediary of our ideas.

6 Although the subject can know things only “by means of” his ideas, Descartes does not consider the idea as a mere mental, private, object, since “to have an idea” is nothing other than to have “a perception that responds to the meaning of a word”. [5] He is far from identifying the idea with a copy, a similitude, of things outside us, in which things would be seen “as in a mirror”—ideas are tanquam rerum imagines, “like images of things” his critique of scholastic species shows that he does not agree that resemblance explains the representative function of ideas. [6]

7 In Descartes”s vocabulary, “perception” designates, in general, the possession of an idea, the mental act or state of representing such and such a thing, and not necessarily what we now call “perception”—or more precisely, “sensible perception”. As we know, Descartes proposes a particular explanation for the latter in Dioptrics IV. After all, his description of the nature of ideas returns to the framework of the general theory of a perception “mediated” by ideas.

8 In the examination of the nature and the status of the Cartesian philosophy of ideas, Austin is useful because, although he takes up the critique of the theory of “indirect” perception, he begins by emphasising that the question of knowing whether we should be direct realists is badly posed:

10 In Sense and Sensibilia, Austin gives an analysis of the famous illusion of the stick “bent” by its immersion in water, [8] which goes back prior to Descartes, to a fourteenth-century author, Pierre d”Auriole. [9] Austin demonstrates the ambiguity of expressions such as “looks like” or “seems to be”, as in when we say “the stick seems to be bent”. The argument from illusion would maintain that experience is representational and that, in perception, we have “a visual appearance” that is the immediate object of vision. In other words, it would judge that the stick is bent in so far as it is effectively represented as bent. Austin argues, on the contrary, that this is not a case of an illusion of the senses, but maintains that what we have an experience of, is a stick partly immersed in water, and which seems bent to us. Things look like what they are, no more and no less. [10]

11 The “argument from illusion”—the idea that our senses can be fooled—is thus a pretext for positing the existence of intermediary entities, or what he designates, in the context of analytic philosophy, with the term “sense-perceptions”:

13 Austin emphasises that we are not deceived by our senses, but neither do they inform us sensory perceptions are not incorrigible: the way in which things appear to us is perpetually corrigible. Rereading the Cartesian texts on the basis of Austin”s analyses will allow me to show that treating perception as a mental act does not necessarily imply that representations must be considered as objects that are perceived. It is because we can change our way of seeing things, that we can say that we only know things through the intermediary of our ideas. If things look like what they are, as Austin thinks, it would be regrettable to judge them, as we often do, as mere appearances. Certainly, to see is above all to see the things of the world but to say that our perceptions are that by which we think, or perceive, is simply to draw our attention to the fact that, in reflecting upon our thoughts, we can change our way of seeing, and that, in so far as philosophy is an activity which consists in making our thoughts clear, it constitutes a desirable change. [12]


Only True Empaths Can Pass This Imagery Personality Test: QUIZ

You have been hearing it probably that you are an empath but you are confused. This fun Imagery Empath test will reveal your true personality.

“Empathy is the only human superpower – it can shrink distance, cut through social and power hierarchies, transcend differences, and provoke political and social change.” ― Elizabeth Thomas

Empathy is very important because we can understand and feel how others are feeling and respond accordingly to the situation. Research shows that greater the empathy more will be the helping behaviour.

Empathy is related to kindness but being an empath is much more than being kind. It’s about feeling the energies, about absorbing the energies of others around you. You might be a kind and sensitive person but you might not be an empath. While some empaths can identify themselves, some find it difficult to do so.

Being an empath is advantageous because we can sense others intentions and help or deceive them.

So, if your peers are telling you that you are an empath and you want to be sure of it or if you are having a feeling within yourself that you are an empath, you should take this quiz.

This quiz tests you with some imageries and calculates the results revealing your true identity, whether you are a highly sensitive person or an actual empath.


To what category of optical illusions does this image belong? - Psychology

It must be one of the most familiar images in modern art: a space-distorting interior that could never exist in reality, dominated by staircases sprouting surreally in all directions, and filled with expressionless, mannequin-like figures walking up and down like members of a religious order calmly going about their daily business.

Since the original lithograph was produced in the summer of 1953, Relativity – which belongs to a series of five prints by the same artist also featuring impossible constructions and multiple vanishing points – has been reproduced countless times on posters, mugs, T-shirts, items of stationery and even duvet covers.

Yet, if we’re honest, how much do most of us really know about its creator, the Dutch printmaker MC Escher (1898-1972)? The truth is that outside his homeland Escher remains something of an enigma. Moreover, despite the popularity of his fastidious optical illusions, Escher continues to suffer from snobbery within the realm of fine art, where his output is often denigrated as little more than technically accomplished graphic design.

In Britain, for instance, it appears that only a single work by Escher belongs to a public collection: the woodcut Day and Night, which presents two flocks of birds, one black and one white, flying above a flat Dutch landscape in between a pair of rivers. Day and Night was Escher’s most popular print: during the course of his lifetime, he made more than 650 copies of it, painstakingly rendering each impression with the help of a small egg spoon made of bone.

Day and Night was Escher’s most popular print: during the course of his lifetime (Credit: 2015 The M.C. Escher Company – Baarn, The Netherlands)

Yet, as Patrick Elliott of the Scottish National Gallery of Modern Art points out, even the print of Day and Night in the collection of the University of Glasgow’s Hunterian Museum and Art Gallery “was actually acquired by the Geography Department and was transferred to the Museum at a later date”.

So who was Escher – and does he deserve the indifferent reputation as a fine artist that fate has dealt him? These are some of the questions posed by The Amazing World of MC Escher, a forthcoming exhibition at the Scottish National Gallery of Modern Art in Edinburgh, which also happens to be the artist’s first major UK retrospective.

‘Miserable memories’

Born in the small city of Leeuwarden in the north of the Netherlands, Maurits Cornelis Escher, who was always known in his family as “Mauk”, grew up in a prosperous household as the fifth son of a civil engineer who was a senior official at the Department of Public Works.

At secondary school in the city of Arnhem, where his family had moved in 1903, he had an unhappy time – and his miserable memories of this period of his life had a decisive influence upon many of his later prints, including Relativity.

Indeed, decades after “the hell that was Arnhem”, as Escher later described his schooldays, he made a number of works featuring versions of the institution’s dramatic staircase, which he had ascended so frequently as a boy. The resemblance between the school’s staircase in reality and the structures in Escher’s prints is remarkable.

In 1919, Escher enrolled at the School of Architecture and Decorative Arts in Haarlem. His father hoped that he would become an architect, but, influenced by his graphic arts teacher, who had spotted his talent as a printmaker, Escher was determined to become an artist. As an adult, he pursued this career – combining travel, when he sketched and came up with ideas for future works (his two visits to the Moorish palace of the Alhambra in Granada were especially important, since they taught him how to work with tessellating patterns), with long stints at home, where he led a remarkably orderly life.

“He had a severe daily routine mixing working and walking and meeting visitors,” says Micky Piller, curator of Escher in Het Paleis, the museum devoted to the artist’s works in The Hague, where selections are shown from the collection of the Gemeentemuseum, which has also loaned works to the exhibition in Edinburgh. “He liked to observe nature, the sky, and birds. He loved classical music, especially Bach.”

A ‘one-man art movement’

Despite his self-discipline, however, Escher only became able to support himself solely from art during his late fifties. By then he had discovered his principal theme of perspective-mangling worlds, familiar from works such as Belvedere (1958), Ascending and Descending (1960), and Waterfall (1961), as well as Relativity. He was also known for executing his prints to a very high level.


Belonging to Many Social Groups Matters More in Some Cultures

Decades of psychology research have shown something that pretty much makes sense: people who belong to more social groups tend to be happier. People who belong to multiple social groups have more access to social support, so it didn’t really come as a surprise when study after study confirmed that these people score higher on measures of psychological wellbeing.

But wait! There’s a problem.

Like a lot of psychological research, most of these studies were done on WEIRD people – that is, Western, educated people from industrialized, rich, democratic countries.

This limitation of previous research led a group of psychologists from University of Queensland to suggest that the link between multiple social group membership and happiness might be culture-specific.

What clued them onto this idea was that access to social support is one of the main benefits of multiple group membership, but different cultures have different norms around seeking social support. Asians and Asian Americans, for example, seem to be less likely to seek out social support, possibly because they’re more attentive to possible downsides of doing so like burdening others.

Based on this, the researchers from University of Queensland conjectured that Westerners would benefit more than Asians from belonging to multiple social groups.

To test their hypothesis, they performed a series of studies looking at participants’ social group membership and psychological wellbeing. As expected, the studies showed that Westerners who belonged to more social groups – including through friends, family, recreational activities, etc. – reported being happier and less depressed.

When the researchers looked at Asian participants, however, they didn’t find the same effect. In fact, belonging to more social groups generally just wasn’t associated with being happier for these participants. The one exception was for Asians who were the least reluctant to seek out social support from others – among this small subgroup, multiple group membership was related to happiness.

These findings indicate that belonging to many social groups may be more important in some cultures than others because cultural norms can determine what people get out of multiple group membership.

More generally, this research is also a reminder that things we think we know about how people work can turn out only to be true of how people work in certain environments.

All told, you’re still doing yourself a favor by actively participating in more social groups rather than fewer. But just belonging to many social groups may not be enough – whether multiple group membership affects your happiness seems to depend on whether you’re proactive about seeking out the advantages associated with the groups you belong to.

What d’you think? Are you surprised that the link between multiple social group membership and happiness is culture-specific? Please share in the comments!


To what category of optical illusions does this image belong? - Psychology

Media Licence:

Illusion Credit

Instructions

Look at the cube and think about where the front face of the cube is. Is it above or below the back face? Hover your cursor over the image and then remove it to highlight different faces of the cube that you might experience as being the front face.

Effect

One can experience the cube in two distinct ways: (1) with the front face of the cube below and to the left of the back face of the cube, (2) with the front face of the cube above and to the right the back face of the cube. One's experience seems to "flip" from being as of a cube pointing down and left to a cube pointing up and to the right. In addition, it is possible to experience the image just as a series of 2-D lines on the screen.

Media Licence:

Illusion Credit

The Necker Cube Ambiguous Figure is named after its creator, Louis Albert Necker (1786-1861), who first published the illusion in the London and Edinburgh Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science in 1832.

The Necker Cube Ambiguous Figure belongs in a large class of illusions where a two-dimensional figure, or three-dimensional object can be seen in two or more sharply distinct ways. There are many example of ambiguous figures which you can search for in this illusions index.

One reason that the Necker Cube is so interesting is that although it is perhaps most natural to see the image as one of two cubes differently oriented in space, it is possible to see it as simply a 2-D figure on the page. Therefore the Necker Cube is three-way ambiguous. The fact that one can see the image as both 2-D and 3-D feeds into the debate about whether visual experience represents 2-D or 3-D space. If the 2-D/3-D Gestalt switch is a change in the visual experience itself as seems to be the case (rather than a change in our beliefs about the image) then this would best be explained by visual experience being as of 3-D space.

Relatedly, there is another version of the Necker Cube which looks like a 2-D figure at first, but can be seen as a 3-D cube also, as illustrated below.

There is some controversy over how the Necker Cube Ambiguous Figure works. It is generally agreed that the retinal image is constant when experiencing the illusion, but what is not agreed is whether the visual experience of the cube changes when the perspectival switch takes place, or whether the experience itself does not change, and it is some post-experiential belief, judgment, or other mental process which changes. The Necker Cube, among other ambiguous figures, has been cited in debates over this issue (Silins 2015: §2.4).

This issue is intertwined with more general questions about the modularity of mind and cognitive penetration. To explain: on the hypothesis that the mind is modular, a mental module is a kind of semi-independent department of the mind which deals with particular types of inputs, and gives particular types of outputs, and whose inner workings are not accessible to the conscious awareness of the person – all one can get access to are the relevant outputs. So, in the case of visual illusions, for example, a standard way of explaining why the illusion persists even though one knows that one is experiencing an illusion is that the module, or modules, which constitute the visual system are ‘cognitively impenetrable’ to some degree – i.e. their inner workings and outputs cannot be influenced by conscious awareness. It is still an open question regarding the extent to which perceptual modules are cognitively impenetrable, and ambiguous figures are employed in debates to try and answer that question. One way in which ambiguous figures might support the claim that visual processing is impenetrable to a significant degree is that the Gestalt switch is hard to control – often one will see a figure one way or another even if one is trying to see it the other way. Macpherson discusses this phenomenon and its implications in her 2012 paper. Further, there is some evidence from neuroscience that, for at least some ambiguous figures, there are significant changes in early-stage visual processing in the brain when the Gestalt switch is taking place, which might support the hypothesis that Gestalt switches in general are changes in the experience itself rather than in downstream mental processes like beliefs about that experience (see Kornmeier & Bach 2006, 2012).

Finally, ambiguous figures have been cited in debates about whether the nature of experience can be fully accounted for by appealing only to its representational content. Some philosophers and cognitive scientists distinguish between the phenomenal character of an experience – i.e. what it is like for a conscious subject to undergo that experience – and its representational content – i.e. what the experience is about. Some philosophers, known as ‘representationalists’ argue that the phenomenal character of experience can be accounted for fully in terms of the representational content of experience. One motivation for this argument is that representational content seems easier to ‘naturalise’ – i.e. for its nature to be explained in purely materialist terms by appealing solely to physical entities like brain states. Phenomenal character, on the other hand, seems much more resistant to attempts to naturalise it. But if phenomenal character can be fully accounted for in representationalist terms, then this would make the naturalising of phenomenal character seem much more tractable. And, ambiguous figures are among the key examples discussed in debates about whether phenomenal character can be fully accounted for in representationalist terms. For example, Macpherson (2006) has argued that the changes in phenomenal character that occur when experiencing some ambiguous figures cannot be explained in naturalistic, representationalist terms. Macpherson’s 2006 paper provides an overview of the general debate and its many moving parts.

References

Kornmeier, J. and Bach, M., 2005. The Necker cube—an ambiguous figure disambiguated in early visual processing. Vision research, 45(8), pp.955-960.

Kornmeier, J. and Bach, M., 2012. Ambiguous figures–what happens in the brain when perception changes but not the stimulus. Frontiers in human neuroscience, 6.

Necker, L.A., 1832. Observations on some remarkable optical phaenomena seen in Switzerland and on an optical phaenomenon which occurs on viewing a figure of a crystal or geometrical solid. London and Edinburgh Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science, third series, Vol. 1, No. 5, pp. 329-337.

Silins, N., 2015. Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Justification. In: Zalta, E. N., ed. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, CSLI, Stanford University.

Macpherson, F., 2006. Ambiguous figures and the content of experience. Noûs 40 (1):82-117.

Macpherson, F., 2012. Cognitive penetration of colour experience: Rethinking the issue in light of an indirect mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(1), pp.24-62.


Watch the video: 20 Optical Illusions That Confuse the Smartest People (August 2022).