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Changing Voluntary to Involuntary by will

Changing Voluntary to Involuntary by will


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As we all know, certain actions like,

  • blinking of eye
  • breathing

all happen involuntarily, and we have the option to control them voluntarily as well(holding breath etc… ) when needed.

But, once we change our focus on something else for a few minutes, we forget that we had voluntary control(like holding breath etc… ), and involuntary actions takes place automatically.

So, Can we transfer voluntary control to involuntary by will?

P.S. Since the question is about experience, I couldn't ask more clearly. Sorry for that. :)


Psychology and Philosophy on Free Will

One of the more heated debates in current psychology and philosophy is the existence of free will. The belief that we are the conscious scripter and performer of our thoughts, actions, and mental processes. But are these beliefs set in stone? Other theories have been drafted to challenge free will in intellectual circles. Determinists, for example, maintain that thoughts and actions are determined by prior causes (parents, schooling, country of birth, etc.) or by chance. In this view, we experience thoughts and actions rather than perform them. Another example is fatalism, the belief that everything is already determined by the universe. Fatalists are similar to determinists, because they too belief that our conscious selves experience actions rather than perform them. The slight distinction between determinism and fatalism is that fatalists don’t belief that chance plays a factor, because the future is already determined. In this view, your life is a movie (albeit a lengthy one) that already has a cast, script, and ending in mind. While an overwhelming majority of humans adopt the view of free will, the concept is of major practical importance, and plenty of psychological and philosophical aspects are being considered competent enough to weigh in one such a question. I consider three aspects of psychology below, which are the neuroscientific perspective, the humanistic perspective, and the behaviorist perspective,

The Neuroscience Perspective

New neuroimaging studies done through the use of Electroencephalogram (EEG) machines cast doubt on free will, as scientists can now predict choices participants will make in simple studies before the test subjects have consciously made up their mind, as shown in the picture above. Other experiments show the ‘firing off’ of motor neurons ( the part of the brain responsible for voluntary movement) 300 milliseconds before subjects become consciously aware of the desire to move. This seems to support the theory that decisions and actions are the result of prior causes. Free will suggests that we tell our brains what to do, and actions follow. Neuroimaging says neurons move, then we tell our brains what to do, and actions follow. So the neurons in this case are the prior cause. Studies like these have led to skeptics of free will, mostly through the neuroscientist community. However, this is not to say that the community is of one mind. Michael Gazzaniga, the lead experimenter on the famous corpus callosum experiment, claims that people are still responsible for their actions, regardless of the outcome of the free will question.

The Humanist Perspective

Humanistic psychologists like Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers are the group most likely to employ the concept of free will. Their main argument is that free will is necessary for self-actualization and change in one’s behavior. “How can humans change themselves without free will? How can drug addicts become clean? How can people become more compassionate?” Humanists also claim that the difference between voluntary and involuntary actions is clear evidence that free will must be inserted into the clockwork, as to make sense of this distinction. This argument is not as airtight as others. Sam Harris in his book Free Will points out that as long as the voluntary acts are preceded through prior causes or chance, the voluntary/involuntary distinction is a moot question.

The Behaviorist Perspective

Behavior psychology focuses mainly on observing actions, and has no opinion on mental processes. They claim that while consciousness will not be able to be reduced to a blackboard, focusing on actions and decisions that can be studied and quantified is time better spent. The behavioralist community is split on the question of free will. Some look at experiments where people are less likely to help others in need when subjects are in big groups of people, as opposed to being the only one who can lend a hand (known as the diffusion of responsibility effect) . Since the data suggests that people’s decisions can be heavily influenced by their surroundings, it seems to make advocates of free will queasy. Others depend on a simple behaviorist thought experiment. A participant enters a room with two muffins and is asked to choose one. With free will he chooses a muffin. Now imagine the same experiment with a subject without free will. He is given the same test and chooses a muffin. Finally, imagine you are the experimenter that watched both participants from a tv screen in another room. Could you discern the difference between the two? Regardless of free will or not, a choice was still made. That choice, in a sense, is yours whether or not you or your body decides to initiates that choice. Therefore, unless a distinction can be made between the two test subjects, free will (sort of) exists.

Since many aspects of current culture (politics, religion, court systems) rely on the assumption of free will, arguments from multiple directions like these and ones to come have serious practical consequences. And already the results aren’t encouraging. Students are more likely to cheat on exams after reading articles claiming that free will is an illusion.

Many philosophical belief systems take shelter in the assumption of free will. The concept of sin hangs in the balance of this debate. Humans absent of free will would be, by definition, not responsible for their actions. Therefore punishing people for being sinful would make no sense, because humans could therefore be reduced to biological puppets acting upon unknowable factors. This would certainly render beliefs like the Abrahamic religion’s concept of heaven and hell false, with the exception of a few Islamic sects that have a belief in fatalism. People also may be discouraged from acting morally if free will is proven to be false. If they don’t feel in charge, why not just sit back and let whatever is going to happen, happen? Others think it can inspire empathy, as people are less likely to be angry at someone’s poor decision if they realize he the the experiencer, not the performer. Hate of others seemed to be undermined if they’re not in charge of themselves.


Notes on Voluntary, Involuntary and Habitual Attention

Sometimes an individual will divert his attention towards a particular activity or situation deliberately.

It is not diverted spontaneously, but after some struggle. For example, while sitting in a class, the students divert their attention towards the lecture even if it is not interesting, because they have to pass the examination.

2. Involuntary Attention:

At times the attention is diverted towards some other activity without the conscious effort, may be against the will of the individual.

This is known as involuntary attention. For example, though the student is listening to a lecture with all interest, some loud sound outside the classroom may draw his attention towards it.

3. Habitual Attention:

In some situations, reaction to a stimulus or attending to a stimulus becomes a habit. So the individual will automatically divert his attention towards that stimulus. For example, a musician’s attention will automatically be diverted towards the sound of music even if he is busily engaged in talking to somebody.

Attention of a devotee will be diverted towards the temple which he is visiting regularly, the moment he passes through that way.


Regardless of their impetus for participating in drug treatment—internal drive or external pressure—men had similar outcomes in the long term.

A group of men who completed court-ordered treatment for alcohol and drug problems reported lower intrinsic motivation at the beginning of treatment, but, 5 years later, reported the same rates of abstinence, employment, and rearrest as peers who sought help on their own. The findings from a NIDA- and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Health Services Research and Development Service-supported analysis of data on treatment outcomes affirm the results of shorter term studies that have shown similar therapeutic outcomes for voluntary and legally mandated patients. The new study also included an important, but largely unstudied, comparison group: people who had been in court, but were not mandated to enter treatment.

"Once in a therapeutic environment, mandated patients seem to reflect on their situation and accept the need for treatment," says Dr. John Kelly, lead investigator of the study, conducted at the VA Palo Alto Healthcare System and Stanford University School of Medicine. "Our findings suggest that people can learn from the 'teachable moment' offered by a judicial mandate, even though the initial motivation for treatment is external. Judicial mandates may provide an opportunity for offenders to gain access to and benefit from needed treatment."

Drs. Kelly, Rudolf Moos, and John Finney analyzed data, gathered by Drs. Moos and Finney and Dr. Paige Ouimette, on 2,095 men who were treated for alcohol and drug problems in 15 VA programs and followed for 5 years. About half the men (54 percent) were addicted to drugs 80 percent were dependent on alcohol. Most (82 percent) had no criminal justice system involvement and entered treatment voluntarily (No-JSI) 7 percent were on probation or parole and were required to participate in treatment by order of a court or criminal justice official (JSI-M) 11 percent had been before a court, but not mandated to treatment (JSI). About half (49 percent) of the participants were African-American 45 percent were White and the remaining 6 percent were Hispanic, Native American, or Asian. Most (74 percent) were unemployed when they started treatment.

The men completed 21 or 28 days of residential treatment, which took one of three therapeutic approaches: group psychotherapy and individual activities based on the 12-step approach, cognitive-behavioral therapy, or a mix of both. When they completed treatment, the men were urged to participate in outpatient programs and self-help activities.

At the beginning of treatment, each man completed a questionnaire that assessed characteristics considered important to recovery: motivation, self-efficacy, coping skills, 12-step participation, psychiatric symptoms, history of negative consequences of alcohol and drug problems, number of previous treatment episodes, and whether they considered themselves to be addicted. They also reported any prior year arrests and any judicial mandate for treatment. At the end of the treatment program, participants repeated the assessment and reported their perceptions of the therapeutic experience. Most also received a self-administered assessment in the mail at the 1- and 5-year follow up points, with the rest contacted by telephone or in person. Research assistants telephoned patients when necessary to complete or clarify information.

In the initial assessment, men in the JSI-M group reported experiencing fewer negative consequences of alcohol and drug consumption, fewer symptoms of depression and anxiety, and less desire to abstain than No-JSI or JSI participants. Fewer mandated (45 percent) than voluntary patients (58 percent) met the standard clinical criteria for drug addiction. Voluntary patients more frequently recognized their addictions, connected them to other problems, and reported a readiness to change.


Will involuntary hospitalization show up on a background check ?

But how do they find out? As far as I know there isn't a universal healthcare database. If there was I wouldn't have to fill out a new form every time I saw a new doctor. Do you just sign a release for every mental hospital in the US?

I'm not trying to get a gun, in case anyone was wondering.

I think I remember actually asks you on the gun application. I'm not trying to get a gun, either, but I believe I have the right to get one as long as I'm not violent. I might want one for self-defense one day (and that means getting trained to use it, too. Getting one and not being trained ups your chances of yourself ending up hurt). The point is, it's my American right, and people's rights shouldn't be taken away without solid reason.

But as for how they'd find out, I just assumed it would show up in a background check. But I've never done one, so I don't know.

Equal Rights Are Not Special Rights

I think I remember actually asks you on the gun application. I'm not trying to get a gun, either, but I believe I have the right to get one as long as I'm not violent. I might want one for self-defense one day (and that means getting trained to use it, too. Getting one and not being trained ups your chances of yourself ending up hurt). The point is, it's my American right, and people's rights shouldn't be taken away without solid reason.

But as for how they'd find out, I just assumed it would show up in a background check. But I've never done one, so I don't know.

there is a reporting system for treatment providers similar to how a treatment provider notifies the DMV that their patient is not safe driving a vehicle.

if a treatment provider suspects their client should not have a gun they must report it to the federal firearms database that all licensed firearms dealers must verify the applications through.

if a mentally ill person has a gun that means their treatment provider either didnt do their reporting process or they felt the person was not a danger if they possessed a firearm.

I have to say that although I personally don't like guns, I'm 100% against blanket restrictions being placed on the mentally ill. For one thing, if someone wants to use a gun to commit a crime they are going to find a way to get one, no matter what. As a matter of fact most do not own the firearms legally. So this doesn't prevent any crime.

For another, everyone should be assessed on a case by case basis. Mental illness isn't this general thing that affects every person in the same way. For example, addiction often co occurs with MI. I, however have never struggled with that. Is it fair to assume that I'm going to become an addict, just because so many others have? I find it funny that although mental illness seems a lot more complex and case based than physical illness, we are generalized way more than they are.

In short, I think a provider being able to contact a third party without your permission is absurd.

I have to say that although I personally don't like guns, I'm 100% against blanket restrictions being placed on the mentally ill. For one thing, if someone wants to use a gun to commit a crime they are going to find a way to get one, no matter what. As a matter of fact most do not own the firearms legally. So this doesn't prevent any crime.

For another, everyone should be assessed on a case by case basis. Mental illness isn't this general thing that affects every person in the same way. For example, addiction often co occurs with MI. I, however have never struggled with that. Is it fair to assume that I'm going to become an addict, just because so many others have? I find it funny that although mental illness seems a lot more complex and case based than physical illness, we are generalized way more than they are.

In short, I think a provider being able to contact a third party without your permission is absurd.

the gun safety laws went into place because of things like sandy hook, school shootings and other mass shootings that have happened here in the USA, in just about every case at one point the shooter or shooters family said the one going on mass shooting sprees in in the schools, shopping malls, movie theaters and such other public mass shootings, was mentally ill with PTSD, Schizophrenia, bipolar and many other mental disorders. the result of this was laws were enacted for helping to stop this kind of violence by having a reporting process. just like a medical doctor can now prevent people with seizure disorders from killing people with driving and having seizures behind the wheel. granted these reporting systems are not without their problems and quirks my suggestion is if one doesnt want to end up flagged dont make threats to harm people, dont be a danger to oneself and others, that way their treatment providers wont have reason to do their reporting systems process because they know someone is a danger to their self and others. and yes I know in some situations the mentally ill do not realize that they are a danger to their self and others. if they did and could control it then there would not have been a reason for this gun safety reporting system. when you think about it laws are not just made and plucked out of the air. there is a reason behind why a law was proposed. went through the legislative process and passed into a law. maybe someday all these people who have mental disorders and shooting up anyone and everyone in mass shootings of schools, churches, shopping malls and other public venues no longer happen so that the laws and reporting system will no longer be needed.

I for one feel a bit safer knowing I can go out to dinner, go to a movie or show, or go to a bar, go shopping, attend my church, take my children to daycare and their schools without worrying every second whether the person next to me is going to whip out a gun, the fear is still there just like a natural disaster is in the back of my mind but at least I dont have to spend my life hiding under a desk.

my point is all these reporting databases for things like when someone is hospitalized, isnt safe with a vehicle or gun well they are now just a matter of public access here in the USA and in some cases for the safety of all. its the world we live in now.


7. Freedom to Will

The second question regarding the relation between freedom and the will that Locke takes to be significant is &ldquoWhether a Man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, Motion or Rest&rdquo (E1&ndash5 II.xxi.25: 247). Consider a particular action A. What Locke is asking is whether an agent is free with respect to the action of willing that A occur. For example, suppose that I am sitting in a chair and that A is the action of walking to the fridge. Locke wants to know whether I am free with respect to willing the action of walking to the fridge.

Most commentators think that Locke&rsquos answer to this question is NO. The main evidence for this interpretation is what Locke says about the question immediately after raising it:

This Question carries the absurdity of it so manifestly in it self, that one might thereby sufficiently be convinced, that Liberty concerns not the Will. (E5 II.xxi.25: 247)

It is tempting to suppose that the thought that &ldquoLiberty concerns not the Will&rdquo is the thought that agents are not free to will, and that Locke is saying that we are driven to this thought because the second question is absurd, in the sense of demanding a negative answer.

But it is difficult to make sense of what Locke goes on to say in II.xxi.25 if he is interpreted as answering the second question negatively. Section 25 continues:

For to ask, whether a Man be at liberty to will either Motion, or Rest Speaking, or Silence which he pleases, is to ask, whether a Man can will, what he wills or be pleased with what he is pleased with. (E1&ndash5 II.xxi.25: 247)

Locke says that the second question reduces to another that can be put in two different ways: whether a man can will what he wills, and whether a man can be pleased with what pleases him. (The reason it can be put in these two different ways, at least in E1, is that Locke there adopts a desiderative theory of willing, according to which willing an action is a matter of being more pleased with the action than with its forbearance.) But asking whether a man can will what he wills, or whether a man can be pleased with what he is pleased with, is similar to asking whether a man can steal what he steals. And the answer to all of these questions is: &ldquoOF COURSE!&rdquo

It is obvious that whatever it is that a man actually steals he can steal. Similarly, it is obvious that whatever it is that a man actually wills (or is actually pleased with) is something that he can will (or can be pleased with). The reason is that it is a self-evident maxim (just as self-evident as the maxim that whatever is, is&mdashsee E1&ndash5 IV.vii.4: 592&ndash594) that whatever is actual is possible. Locke, it seems, wishes to answer the second question in the affirmative!

This raises the issue of what Locke could possibly mean, then, when he describes the second question as &ldquoabsurd&rdquo. One possibility is that, for Locke, a question counts as absurd not only when the answer to it is obviously in the negative (think: &ldquoIs the will free?&rdquo), but also when the answer to it is obviously in the affirmative (think: &ldquoIs it possible for you to do what you are actually doing?&rdquo). But it also raises the issue of why Locke would think that the second question actually reduces to an absurd question of the latter sort. One possible solution derives from Locke&rsquos theory of freedom of action. As we have seen, Locke thinks that one is free with respect to action A if and only if (i) if one (actually) wills to do A, then one can do A, and (ii) if one (actually) wills not to do A, then one can avoid doing A. Applying this theory directly to the case in which A is the action of willing to do B, we arrive at the following: one is free with respect to willing to do B if and only if (i) if one (actually) wills to will to do B, then one can will to do B, and (ii) if one (actually) wills to avoid willing to do B, then one can avoid willing to do B. Suppose, then, that willing to will to do an action is just willing to do that action, and willing to avoid willing to do an action is just not willing to do that action. In that case, one is free with respect to willing to do B if and only if (i) if one (actually) wills to do B, then one can will to do B, and (ii) if one (actually) avoids willing to do B, then one can avoid willing to do B. Given that actuality obviously entails possibility, it follows that (i) and (ii) are both obviously true. This is one explanation for why Locke might think that the question of whether one is free with respect to willing to do B reduces to an absurd question, the answer to which is obviously in the affirmative. It may be for this reason that Locke says that the question is one that &ldquoneeds no answer&rdquo (E1&ndash5 II.xxi.25: 247).

Locke goes on to say, at the end of II.xxi.25, that

they, who can make a Question of it [i.e., of the second question], must suppose one Will to determine the Acts of another, and another to determinate that and so on in infinitum. (E1&ndash5 II.xxi.25: 247)

It is unclear what Locke means by this. One possibility, consistent with the majority interpretation that Locke provides a negative answer to the second question, is that Locke is providing an argument here for the claim that the proposition that it is possible to be free with respect to willing to do an action leads to a vicious infinite regress of wills. The thought here is that being free with respect to willing to do an action, on Locke&rsquos theory, requires being able to will to do an action if one wills to will to do it that being free with respect to willing to will to do an action then requires being able to will to will to do it if one wills to will to will to do it and so on, ad infinitum. But another possible interpretation, consistent with the minority interpretation that Locke provides an affirmative answer to the second question, is that Locke&rsquos argument here is not meant to target those who answer the question affirmatively, but is rather designed to target those who would &ldquomake a question&rdquo of the second question, i.e., those who think that the answer to the second question is unobvious, and worth disputing. These people are the ones who think that willing to will to do A does not reduce to willing to do A, and that willing to avoid willing to do A does not reduce to avoiding willing to do A. These are the people who are committed to the existence of an infinite regress of wills, each determining the volitions of its successor. According to Locke, who accepts the reductions, the infinite regress of wills can&rsquot get started (see Rickless 2000: 56&ndash65 Garrett 2015: 269&ndash274).


Classical vs. Operant Conditioning

Classical and operant conditioning are two important concepts central to behavioral psychology. While both result in learning, the processes are quite different. To understand how each of these behavior modification techniques can be used, it is also essential to understand how classical and operant conditioning differ from one another.


The characteristics of involuntary and voluntary autobiographical memories in depressed and never depressed individuals

This study compares involuntary and voluntary autobiographical memories in depressed and never depressed individuals. Twenty depressed and twenty never depressed individuals completed a memory diary recording their reactions to 10 involuntary and 10 voluntary memories over 14–30 days. Psychiatric status (Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV, SCID-1), psychopathology, rumination and avoidance were assessed. For both groups, involuntary memories more frequently lead to strong reactions than voluntarily memories. For both modes of retrieval, depressed individuals reported more frequent negative reactions than never depressed individuals and rated memories as more central to identity with higher levels of rumination and avoidance. Depressed individuals retrieved both positive and negative memories during involuntary retrieval. These findings support the view that involuntary memory retrieval represents a basic mode of retrieval during healthy and disordered cognition, and that during depression, both involuntary and voluntary memories are central to identity and associated with rumination and avoidance.

Highlights

► Involuntary memories lead to strong reactions in depressed and never depressed groups. ► Depressed individuals reported involuntary memories for negative, positive and neutral events. ► Depressed individuals show similar reactions during both involuntary and voluntary retrieval. ► The results suggest that involuntary memory retrieval represents a basic mode of retrieval.


Experiential differences between voluntary and involuntary job redundancy on depression, job-search activity, affective employee outcomes and re-employment quality

Correspondence should be addressed to Lea Waters, Department of Management, The University of Melbourne, Parkville 3010, Australia (e-mail: [email protected] ).Search for more papers by this author

University of Melbourne, Australia

Correspondence should be addressed to Lea Waters, Department of Management, The University of Melbourne, Parkville 3010, Australia (e-mail: [email protected] ).Search for more papers by this author

Abstract

The current study used learned helplessness theory and legacy theory to examine experiential differences in voluntary vs. involuntary job redundancy in a baseline study (Study 1) and a 3-month retest (Study 2). The sample for Study 1 comprised 102 job seekers who had voluntarily taken a job redundancy and 114 job seekers who had been made involuntarily redundant from their last job. Results at Study 1 showed that voluntarily redundant participants experienced lower levels of depression and engaged in more job-search activity than those who experienced involuntary redundancy. Employees who became re-employed 3 months later (voluntarily redundant N = 28, involuntarily redundant N = 26) were compared on depression, organizational commitment, perceived job insecurity and perceived re-employment quality. The involuntarily redundant employees reported higher depression, lower organizational commitment, higher perceived job insecurity and lower perceived re-employment quality. The voluntarily redundant employees also experienced a significant drop in depression upon re-employment while the involuntarily redundant employees reported no significant changes to depression scores from baseline. Implications for practice and future research are discussed together with the limitations of the two studies.


Why do therapists use involuntary commitment?

For me, involuntary commitment is the last resort after hours, days, weeks, or months of trying to support a client and ensure their health and safety. Unfortunately, some mental health professionals (especially those who are inexperienced) may rely on this method to control clients, win a power struggle, or “get rid of” clients who are very difficult and resistant. But this is not what a 302 is. Involuntary commitment should occur if the following is happening:

  1. Harm to self or others
  2. Moderate to extreme self-mutilation
  3. Threats to harm or kill self or others
  4. Emotional disturbance and thought disturbance with a history of suicide attempts or gestures
  5. Impulsivity, suicidal ideation, threats, poor anger management, SIB that is severe (cutting, burning, etc) with the intent of killing self.
  6. Violence and threats toward others.


Watch the video: Amadeus Ticket Changer: Reissue u0026 Refund Demo sound (June 2022).


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